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We identify the timing of currency, banking crises and sudden stops in New Zealand from 1880 to
2008, and consider the extent to which empirical models can explain New Zealand’s crisis history.
We find that the cross country evidence on the determinants of crises fits New Zealand experience
reasonably well. A number of the risk factors that correlate with crises internationally–such as domestic
imbalances, external debt, and currency mismatches–were elevated for New Zealand when the country
had more frequent crises and have improved in the recent (more stable) period.  However, a time-series
analysis of New Zealand growth over 120 years shows that global factors–such as the US growth rate
and terms of trade–explain New Zealand growth fairly well, and that crisis dummy variables do not
have significant additional explanatory power. This suggests that having sound institutions and policies
may help avoid severe domestic crises, but will not be sufficient to avoid the domestic economic impact










Reserve Bank of New Zealand




Reserve Bank of New Zealand






The shocks that New Zealand has recently faced in an environment of 
increasing globalisation of the world economy - integration in both goods 
and finance - have resonance to the first era of globalisation in the years 
1880-1913. Globalisation has been associated with an increased incidence of 
financial crises including banking crises, currency crises, debt crises and 
sudden stops.
2 Also along with globalisation business cycles have become 
increasingly synchronised across countries. They have become connected by 
common global shocks which are often financial in nature. In such an 
environment, a small open economy can be hit hard by financial crises 
leading to recessions. It can also be hit by real shocks that reduce its terms of 
trade and the volume of its exports. What factors can prevent global shocks 
from being so damaging? 
In this paper, we look at the crisis history of the New Zealand economy, and 
consider how international cross-country evidence on the determinants of 
crises fits that history. This allows us to identify factors that appeared to 
increase New Zealand’s susceptibility to certain sorts of crisis at certain 
periods, and we are able to use these results to make statements about how 
New Zealand’s level of risk may have changed over recent years.  We also 
see if changing crisis susceptibility has affected our macroeconomic 
dependence on the rest of the world. 
In section two, we briefly review some of the extant cross-country literature 
on the incidence and determinants of various types of financial crises 
including banking, currency, debt crises and sudden stops. Based on this 
research we can isolate variables that can attenuate the impact of shocks. 
These include macro fundamentals like current account balance, low fiscal 
deficits, low money growth, low inflation, low debt to GDP ratios, and 
openness. They also include institutional variables like pegging to the gold 
standard before 1914, having an independent central bank that acts as a 
lender of last resort, having a Parliamentary government and especially, 
having low ‘original sin’ (foreign currency denominated debt), and low 
currency mismatches. 
In section three, we look at the crisis history of New Zealand and consider 
                                                 
2   See Bordo et al (2001). Crisis incidence was relatively high during periods of 




how it fared within the historical context of global financial crises. The New 
Zealand economy has been subject to frequent currency crises (from the 
1930s until 1984) and sudden stops where unwillingness to invest in New 
Zealand forces the current account to rapidly reverse. It also had two 
relatively small but significant banking crises.  However, overall the 
international comparison suggests that New Zealand did quite well in 
avoiding serious financial stress (particularly serious banking crises) as did 
several other countries like Canada and the Scandinavian countries which 
had sound institutions and policies.   
In section four, we estimate the cross-country models of currency crisis and 
sudden stops reviewed in section two using an augmented dataset which 
includes New Zealand. In the existing literature, New Zealand is often not 
included in the estimation samples because of missing values in key 
variables. Based on the results from the estimation, we highlight factors 
which were important in mitigating or exacerbating crisis risk in the country. 
We find that in the first era of globalisation (1880-1913) New Zealand was 
less exposed to currency crises than the average country through having  a 
larger trade surplus and more favourable terms of trade shocks, but was more 
exposed to sudden stops because of its high ‘original sin’.  In the second era 
of globalisation (after 1972), New Zealand was more exposed to currency 
crises than the average country despite its higher per capita income (which 
by itself tends to predict a lower risk of a crisis) because of its weak 
fundamentals. Improvements in these fundamentals since the mid 1990s 
appear to have reduced the risk of currency crises in New Zealand today 
from a decade ago. 
In section five, we explore the impact on New Zealand growth of the 
financial crises as well as global variables such as major country growth or 
the terms of trade.  We find that global variables are effective in explaining 
smoothed paths for New Zealand growth, with the specification surprisingly 
robust over the roughly 120 year period. Once the impact of key global 
variables is taken into account the financial crises in New Zealand appear to 
have little additional explanatory power for the country’s medium-term 
growth paths.  This may suggest that financial crises in New Zealand have 
mainly been an endogenous response to stress brought on by exogenous 
global forces rather than a significant independent source of variation in the 





2  Review of cross-country literature on financial crises 
and their determinants 
2.1     Banking and currency crises and sudden stops from 1880 to 1997 
 
Bordo et al (2001) identified currency crises, banking crises and twin crises 
for a panel of 21 countries (both advanced and emerging) from 1880 to 1997 
and also for a larger panel of 56 countries from 1973 to 1997. Currency 
crises, defined as a market based attack on the exchange value of a currency, 
were identified using an ‘exchange market pressure  indicator’ defined as a 
weighted average of changes in exchange rates, reserves and short-term 
interest rates, and alternatively, a survey of expert opinion. Banking crises 
defined as bank runs, significant bank failures, suspensions of convertibility 
and fiscal resolutions were based on World Bank dates for post 1971 and on 
historical narratives for earlier periods. Twin crises were defined as banking 
and currency crises in the same or consecutive years. 
Other papers in the crisis literature have also looked at sovereign debt crises, 
and sudden stops.  Because New Zealand has not experienced a sovereign 
debt crisis, we do not discuss that literature in this paper. A sudden stop is 
defined as an abrupt reduction in net capital inflows (or a relevant proxy), 
with some definitions also requiring that the reduction in capital inflow must 
be coincident with or precede a decline in real GDP.  Sudden stops are fairly 
common in New Zealand economic history (see section 3). 
Bordo et al (2001) and subsequent papers have developed stylised facts on 
crisis incidence including the following: 
•  Crises are reasonably frequent and appear to have gradually become 
more frequent in recent years, with crisis incidence in the Bordo et al 
(2001) dataset averaging around 12 percent of country years in the 
dataset since 1973.   
•  Typically crisis incidence is higher in emerging economies, with the 
period between the two world wars one exception. 
•  Crises are correlated with substantial periods of below trend 
economic growth that cumulate into significant implied output loss. 
There is considerable historical evidence of contagion (or at least bunching 
across countries) of financial crises. This may reflect common fundamentals 
such as similar current account imbalances or similar balance sheet problems 
in the banking system. It also may reflect transmission of shocks between  
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countries via the current and capital accounts.  For example, figure 1 shows 
the countries affected by crises in the same year from the first openness 




Crisis dates in the first Globalisation period 









1889 Brazil France S. Africa
1890 Argentina Brazil UK USA
1891 Argentina Canada Italy Portugal Russia USA Uruguay
1892 Portugal




1897 Brazil Netherlands Sweden
1898 Brazil Chile
1899
1900 Brazil Egypt Finland Japan
1901 Brazil Germany Japan
1902




1907 Chile Denmark Egypt France Germany Italy Japan Mexico Sweden USA





1913 Uruguay  
Source: Bordo and Meissner (2006a).  Crises include currency, banking and debt crises. 
                                                 
3 Also see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) who have extended the data base of financial crises 
in Bordo et al (2001) to include many more countries and to include episodes back to 1800 
and forward to 2008. The pattern echoes that of figure 1 but shows the recurrence of 




2.2 Determinants  of  Crises 
 
Bordo and Meissner (2009) outline theoretical reasons to expect foreign 
capital flows to increase susceptibility to financial crises and consider 
institutional variables that may alter that susceptibility.  Where a period of 
buoyant capital inflows has coincided with a period of excessive optimism 
and sparked rising asset prices and leverage, economies become vulnerable 
to shifts in the willingness of creditors to roll over loans and supply further 
capital.  It is harder for an asset price cycle to develop if capital inflows are 
not able to play a part (since the banking system’s ability to expand its 
balance sheet to accommodate rising asset prices will be constrained).  When 
capital inflows become less forthcoming, policy options for the country 
depend on factors like whether there is a lender of last resort; deep and liquid 
financial markets exist; the quality of private lending has been high; 
international borrowing has been in local currency; and the fiscal position is 
sound. These factors help generate credibility and confidence and provide 
room for the government and central bank to provide liquidity support to the 
financial system.  If they are not present, the risk that a desire to withdraw 
capital becomes disorderly (leading to a sudden stop and potential currency 
and banking crises) is more significant. 
The denomination of fiscal and private sector debt is often an important 
factor in increasing susceptibility to financial crises. The denomination of 
fiscal and private sector debt in foreign currency (called ‘original sin’ by 
Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999) makes exchange rate depreciation 
expand the scale of debt relative to the domestic economy.  Substantial 
foreign exchange reserves can mitigate this risk to a degree, but it has been a 
relevant part of a number of currency and financial crises (such as the 1990s 
Asian crises) and appears likely to afflict some countries today.  A more 
robust solution is to borrow (directly or effectively after hedging contracts) 
in local currency, so that debt does not expand automatically as the currency 
falls. However there are relatively few countries that are able to do this to a 
significant degree.  
Below we outline empirical evidence from a number of studies based on the 
Bordo et al (2001) dataset on the determinants of financial crises. The data 
provide information on crisis incidents and a wide-range of macroeconomic 
and institutional variables for over 40 countries between 1880 and 1997. The 
period is divided into four sub-periods: the gold standard era (1880-1913), 
the inter-war period (1919-1939), the Bretton Woods era (1945-1971), and 
the post-Bretton Woods era (1972-1997). The gold standard era and the post- 
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Bretton Woods era are considered to be the periods of globalisation in both 
goods and services, and of frequent financial crises. Consequently, crisis 
studies tend to focus on these two periods. In section 4 we will look at how 
New Zealand compares to the sample of countries in crisis incidence and 
determinants during these two periods. 
Determinants of sudden stops 
Bordo, Cavallo and Meissner (2009) provide evidence on the determinants 
of sudden stops in the first era of globalisation 1880-1913, using a pooled 
probit methodology and a sample of 20 emerging countries.  Their principal 
results are that countries which are more open, have lower levels of original 
sin and strong fundamentals (represented by high international reserves to 
notes ratios, lower ratios of debt to GDP, lower rates of money growth, 
lower current account deficits, and higher per capita GDP) have significantly 
lower probabilities of being hit by a sudden stop. They also find that a rise in 
the Bank of England’s Bank rate significantly raises the probability of a 
sudden stop. 
They then test for the growth effects of sudden stops. Their results, based on 
a treatment effects growth regression to deal with problems of endogeneity, 
are that sudden stops reduce growth by around 4 percent in the year a sudden 
stop occurs. Sudden stops that are accompanied by financial crises reduce 
growth an additional 3.6 percentage points. 
Determinants of currency crises 
Bordo and Meissner (2009) and Bordo, Meissner and Stuckler (2009) 
provide evidence on the determinants of currency crises using a pooled 
regression  for 19 countries in the first era of globalisation (1880-1913) and 
for 45 countries in the second era of globalisation (1973-1997). For the first 
era of globalisation, they find that a large positive change in the current 
account to GDP ratio and low levels of reserves to notes are both associated 
with high probabilities of a currency crisis. This suggests that currency crises 
are driven by current account reversals and sudden stops. Other variables 
that lead to currency crises include high levels of original sin and a low 
foreign currency debt mismatch. For the second era of globalisation, Bordo 
and Meissner (2006) and Bordo, Meissner and Stuckler (2009) find that high 
current account deficits increase the probability of a currency crisis, as do 
rapid money growth and rising foreign interest rates. They also show that 
high original sin, unless offset by a low mismatch, leads to a greater 
likelihood of a currency crisis. 
Determinants of banking crises 
Bordo and Meissner (2006a, 2006b) provide evidence on the determinants of 
banking crises using a pooled probit for 30 countries from 1880-1913 and  
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over 40 countries between 1972 and 1997. In the first globalisation era, 
countries with weaker fundamentals and financial development tended to be 
more crises prone.  Typically these countries had moderate original sin.   
They also find that the risk of a crisis is offset by a low mismatch, defined as 
international reserves less outstanding hard currency debt divided by exports. 
For the second era of globalisation, Bordo and Meissner find that original sin 
and a high mismatch is associated with a greater chance of a financial crisis 
but that countries with higher levels of per capita income can offset this. 
Other factors leading to a banking crisis include rapid money growth, high 
current account deficits and high foreign interest rates. 
The empirical evidence surveyed above suggests that debtor countries with 
sound fundamentals and institutions could avoid financial crises. A key 
determinant of crises in both eras of globalisation was the exposure to 
foreign currency debt.  However, this could be mitigated by other 
institutional factors.  Countries like the British Dominions, Sweden and 
Denmark and the US in the first era exhibited low risk despite high ratios of 
foreign currency debt to total debt, reflecting their ability to offset their 
exposures with high export receipts in foreign currency or by having large 
international reserves. It also reflected the fact that they had ‘country trust’ 
which Caballero, Cowan and Kearns (2006) describe as being associated 
with sound institutions, the rule of law and stable political systems. 
 
3   History of Financial Crises in New Zealand 
 
New Zealand has been exposed through its short history to both financial 
crises and real shocks. However, its experience with financial crises has been 
relatively benign. New Zealand has not experienced a sovereign debt crisis, 
and its two episodes of banking crisis appear relatively mild compared to 
some international experience.
4  With the exception of a number of currency 
crises in the mid twentieth century its mild crisis experience may only have 
been surpassed by Canada. In this section, we assemble historical data to 
analyse crisis incidence for New Zealand using historical narratives and the 
quantitative methodologies from the literature reviewed in section 2. 
Table 1 contains a chronology of New Zealand’s financial crisis experience 
                                                 
4 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) distinguish the “big five” post-war developed country banking 
crises and show they were coincident with severe economic downturns in those countries, 
much worse than milder banking crises in their dataset including New Zealand’s 1987 
crisis.   
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summarising the crisis dates we use based on the balance of evidence 
analysed.  The reasoning follows, with further technical and data details 
available in the appendix.  While the precise start and end dates of each 
crisis are no doubt open to debate, we think the dates chosen form a 
reasonable basis for the empirical work in the remainder of the paper.  
 
Table 1 
Crisis dates for New Zealand 
Banking Currency  Sudden  Stops 
   1886-1890 
1890-1895    
   1896,98-99 
   1909,14-15,19 
 1931,33  1931-33 
 1938   
   1940,1944-46 
   1953,59 
 1967  1972-73 
 1974-75,79-80  1976-78 
 1984   
1987-1990   1987-88,91 
   1998-99 
Note: Sudden stops are listed in bold if they were coincident with declining real GDP on an 
annual basis.  These are described in Bordo et al (2001) as SS1.  The other sudden stops are 
referred to below as SS2.  
 
Hunt (2009) looks at the New Zealand historical record and identifies two 
banking crises (1890-95 and 1987-1990).  The first crisis (1890-95) began 
with problems in the late 1880s and ended with a government rescue of the 
Bank of New Zealand (BNZ) in 1895. The crisis was caused by the collapse 
of a land boom in the mid- 1880s. The boom in pastoral land was in turn 
triggered by massive government investment in infrastructure in the 1870s 
and favourable wool prices. The boom ended as global commodity prices 
declined and credit provision tightened, as the decline in export prices 
reduced land prices below those capitalized in mortgages and bank credit.  
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This put pressure on the BNZ which had been a key lender. The pressure on 
the BNZ and other New Zealand financial institutions was heightened by 
global events: a sudden stop prompted by the Bank of England raising the 
Bank rate in the late 1880s, the Baring crisis of 1890 in Argentina and 
London, and a massive banking panic in Australia in 1893. The deeper 
underlying cause for all of these crises was a deepening gold deflation 
reflecting a global excess demand for gold in a world on the gold standard. 
Deflationary pressure only ended following gold discoveries in Alaska and 
South Africa in the 1890s. Fearing the effects on the real economy of 
insolvency the BNZ was recapitalized by the government in July 1895. The 
cost of the bailout is estimated to be 1.6 percent of GDP.  This was very mild 
compared to Australia’s crisis which cost well in excess of 10 percent of 
GDP. 
The second banking crisis (1987 to 1990) also involved the BNZ which at 
the time was predominately government owned. The crisis started with a 
bank-financed property boom following deregulation of the financial system 
in 1984. The bust followed the October 1987 Wall Street and local equity 
market crash, which caused a commercial property bust, the failure of 
several non bank financial institutions and substantial losses for the BNZ. 
The BNZ was recapitalised in 1990 at a cost of approximately 1 percent of 
GDP. 
We identify currency crises based on an exchange market pressure index 
supplemented with historical narrative. New Zealand was adjudged to have 
experienced seven currency crises. All of them occurred during pegged 
exchange rate regimes. The first three occurred during the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. A crisis in 1931, the worst year in the global slump, reflected 
pressure on the foreign exchange holdings of the trading banks. It led to a 
10% depreciation of the NZ pound relative to sterling (Quigley 1992) and 
the temporary imposition of exchange controls. In 1933, still in the face of 
contractionary pressure, the NZ pound was devalued by 25 percent against 
sterling. Depletion of the banking system’s foreign exchange reserves 
prompted another crisis in 1938. This led to the institution of a strict 
exchange control and import licensing regime which lasted until the 1980s. 
Another series of crises occurred during the Bretton Woods regime after 
1944. New Zealand didn’t join the IMF until 1961 and kept both capital and 
import controls throughout the regime. Quigley (1992) describes a series of 
crises in the 1950s, but these did not lead to exchange rate depreciation or 
rising interest rates (instead typically being mitigated via intensified import 
controls) so do not meet our definition of a currency crisis.   
The fourth crisis followed the collapse in the wool market in 1966. Wool 
prices declined by around 20% in each of 1967 and 1968 (Reddell and  
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Sleeman 2008). This caused deterioration in the current account and a 
depletion of New Zealand’s reserves. In response the government borrowed 
from the IMF, tightened import controls and then, following Britain’s 
devaluation of sterling in November, New Zealand devalued its currency by 
about 20 percent. 
The fifth and sixth crises followed the oil price shock of 1973 which led to a 
substantial decline in New Zealand’s terms of trade, a serious recession and 
severe pressure on the balance of payments. The NZ dollar was devalued in 
1975 and again in 1976. The second oil price shock in 1979 had similar but 
less severe effects than the first shock. In response the NZ dollar was 
devalued by 5 percent in mid 1979 and the country adopted a crawling peg 
which was abandoned in 1982. 
The final currency crisis we record was in 1984. The NZ dollar was devalued 
by 20 percent following a serious currency crisis during the election 
campaign. This was quickly followed by deregulation of the financial sector 
and the elimination of exchange and capital controls. 
We identify sudden stops  using two measures: SS1 considers a country as 
having a sudden stop during a given year if there is an annual drop in net 
capital inflows of at least two standard deviations below the mean of the year 
to year changes for the period, and /or it is the first year of a drop in net 
capital inflow that exceeds 3 percent of nominal GDP over a period shorter 
than four years, and if there is a drop in real GDP (of any magnitude) during 
that year or the following year. In Table 1 we mark SS1s in bold; SS2 is a 
broader indicator that does not need to be coincident with declining output. 
As can be seen from Table 1, the incidence of several years of sudden stops 
in the 1880s preceded the banking crisis of 1890-95. Sudden stops also 
occurred at the start and end of World War I and preceded the currency 
crises during the Great Depression. In the post-war period they preceded the 
currency crises of 1974-75 and 1979 but followed the banking crisis of 1990 
possibly reflecting the recession of 1991-92. Sudden stops (SS2) occurred 




4 Analysis  of  cross-country  determinants of financial 
crises and implications for New Zealand  
 
Following Bordo and Meissner (2005a, 2005b, and 2007), we examine 
determinants of currency crises and sudden stops using their cross-country 
dataset but augmented with New Zealand data. In the previous studies, New 
Zealand drops out of the estimation sample because of missing values in key 
variables.  
As in the previous studies based on the Bordo et al (2001) dataset, we focus 
on the two periods of globalisation (1880–1913 and 1972–1997) and 
estimate the models of currency crises and sudden stops using pooled 
regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. A 
pooled regression is a common strategy to deal with highly unbalanced panel 
datasets like this one. Many of the countries in the sample have limited time-
series observations, so a panel regression would severely limit the number of 
countries remaining in the estimation sample.
5 A pooled regression involves 
pooling observations across country- and time-dimensions such that a unit of 
observation becomes a country-year, not a country. To allow for the fact that 
same countries are repeatedly observed in the sample, we use robust standard 
errors which allow individual country’s errors to be correlated over time. 
Table A1 and A2 in the appendix report countries in the estimation sample 
and the frequency of crises each had during the two periods of globalisation.    
Tables 2–4 report our results which highlight the factors associated with 
currency crises and sudden stops for a broad group of countries (including 
New Zealand). In each table, column (1) is our benchmark specification with 
all of the key explanatory variables. Overall, the findings of the cross 
country regressions are similar to those reported in Bordo and Meissner 
(2005a, 2005b, and 2007). Many variables are statistically significant, 
suggesting that countries’ policies exerted an important influence on the risk 
of currency crises and sudden stops. 
 
4.1  The first era of globalisation, 1880-1913 
 
In the first era of globalisation New Zealand had no currency crises but faced 
frequent sudden stops. Our cross-country regression results suggest that 
                                                 
5 The New Zealand data we have added has nearly complete time series observations for 
both periods of globalisation.  
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countries that had frequent currency crisis in this period often had large trade 
deficits, negative terms of trade shocks, and high mismatches (table 2). 
Original sin by itself was not significantly related to more currency crises 
(column 1 – 3).  Countries that had a pegged exchange rate (which would 
often have been a commitment to the gold standard) experienced more 
currency crises during this period.  The latter may reflect the fact that a peg 
is more likely to be defended (leading to declining reserves and rising 
interest rates, which are used as evidence of a currency crisis) and will be 
more subject to speculative attack than a clean float.  However, the evidence 
that pegs are more crisis prone may be the result of selection bias, as some 
countries which had been too weak to remain formally pegged were forced 
to float in this era. 
Our cross-country regression results also showed that countries that 
experienced frequent sudden stops in this period tended to have high original 
sin, large trade deficits, and were relatively closed to international trade 
(table 3). A higher original sin was an independently significant factor for 
sudden stops during this period, unlike for currency crises.  The composition 
of debt captured by original sin (the share of hard-currency debt in total 
debt) seem to matter for sudden stops whether we control for the level effect 
(foreign currency debt relative to GDP or total debt relative to GDP, the 
latter not shown). Countries with relatively high per capita incomes, which 
could be a proxy for a better set of institutions, more developed financial 
systems, and/ or better management of debt, tended to have fewer crises. 
Drawing implications for New Zealand, figure 2 plots the estimated 
probability of a crisis in New Zealand over the first period of globalisation. 
Predicted risk for New Zealand was elevated in the late 1880s due to a 
combination of a large trade deficit and negative terms of trade shocks. 
While terms of trade remained volatile throughout, a turnaround in the trade 
balance to a strong surplus in subsequent years contributed to lower 
predicted risks for the rest of the period. Figure 3 plots determinants of 
predicted risk of a currency crisis in New Zealand vis-à-vis average 
predicted risk for the sample.
6   The results suggest that New Zealand 
managed to avoid currency crises by maintaining on average a higher trade 
surplus and lower debt on average, which offset its relative vulnerability 
from having a larger mismatch, a pegged exchange rate, and lower gold 
reserves. Overall New Zealand’s average predicted risk was slightly higher 
than the average predicted risk for the sample for the period. 
                                                 
6 Average predicted risk in the sample is the estimated probability of currency crises when 




Determinants of currency crises, 1880-1913 
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    
Original Sin  -0.052    -0.030    -0.019         
   (0.044)    (0.046)    (0.041)         
Original Sin^2  0.034    0.011    0.002         
   (0.046)    (0.048)    (0.042)         
Mismatch  0.003 *** 0.003    0.002         
   (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.002)         
Debt/revenue  -0.002 *  -0.002    -0.001    -0.002    
   (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.001)    (0.002)    
Growth of terms of trade  -0.916 *** -0.880 ***  -0.905 ***  -0.917  ***
   (0.236)    (0.274)    (0.288)    (0.305)    
Trade balance/ GDP  -0.004 **  -0.004 **  -0.004 ***  -0.004  ** 
   (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)    
Long-term interest rates  -0.007    -0.001    0.000    -0.001    
   (0.005)    (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.005)    
Consol interest rate  -0.019                   
   (0.017)                   
Gold coverage ratio  -0.033    -0.046    -0.052 *  -0.025    
   (0.025)    (0.032)    (0.030)    (0.030)    
Pegged exchange rate  0.021 *** 0.033 ***  0.039 ***  0.031  ***
   (0.007)    (0.012)    (0.011)    (0.010)    
Inflation  0.000                   
   (0.001)                   
Ln(GDP per capita)  -0.008    -0.007    -0.007    -0.010    
   (0.007)    (0.008)    (0.009)    (0.009)    
Banking crisis  0.062    0.064    0.065    0.061    
   (0.062)    (0.061)    (0.063)    (0.061)    
                       
                       
Observations  433    434    434    434    
Observed Risk  0.032    0.035    0.035    0.035    
Predicted Risk (at x-bar)  0.016    0.019    0.020    0.020    
Percent of Correct Positive†  71.4    73.3    73.3    80.0    
Percent of Correct Negative†  69.0    71.1    72.8    70.2    
Pseudo R
2  0.171    0.160    0.155    0.1535    
   
Note: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for a currency crisis. Explanatory variables 
are in one-period lag (t-1) unless otherwise indicated. Reported coefficients are marginal 
effects of variables on the probability of a currency crisis. Robust clustered standard errors 
are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% . † Cut-




Determinants of sudden stops, 1880-1913 
   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    
                       
Original Sin (Hard Currency 
Debt to Total Debt)  0.066 ***       0.066 ***  0.068  *** 
   (0.017)          (0.017)    (0.014)    
Hard currency debt to GDP        0.060 ***           
         (0.017)              
Trade Balance to GDP  -0.278 *** -0.470 *** -0.245 ***       
   (0.108)    (0.140)    (0.089)         
Trade Openness  -0.039    -0.057 **  -0.051 *  -0.050  * 
   (0.033)    (0.025)    (0.029)    (0.027)    
UK Consol rate  -0.038    -0.032              
   (0.031)    (0.032)              
Growth of money  -0.037    -0.021              
   (0.054)    (0.064)              
Gold coverage ratio  -0.055 **  -0.054 *** -0.050 **  -0.034  ** 
   (0.019)    (0.016)    (0.017)    (0.015)    
Ln(GDP per capita)  -0.008    0.012    -0.01 **  -0.016  *** 
   (0.006)    (0.012)    (0.005)    (0.005)    
                          
Observations  448   445   473    473    
Observed Risk  0.040    0.040    0.038    0.038    
Predicted Risk (at x-bar)  0.026    0.029    0.025    0.025    
Percent of Correct Positive†  72.2    72.2    72.2    77.8    
Percent of Correct Negative†  66.3    71.0    63.3    63.3    
Pseudo R
2  0.109    0.103    0.102    0.085    
 
Note: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for sudden stops (SS1). Explanatory variables 
are in one-period lag (t-1) unless otherwise indicated. Reported coefficients are marginal 
effects of variables on the probability of a sudden stop. Robust clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. † Cut-off = 
observed risk in the data.  
17 
 
Figure 2  
















































































Note: * New Zealand did not have a currency crisis for this period. 
 
Figure 3  
Differences in predicted risk of a currency crisis for New Zealand 




























Note: The figure shows differences in predicted risk of a sudden stop for New Zealand 
vis-à-vis the average country in the sample. Each bar represents a marginal contribution 
of a significant variable in the model (reported in Table 2, column 1) to the difference in 
predicted probabilities between New Zealand and the average country in the sample. The 
marginal contribution of each of the variable is calculated by multiplying the estimated 
coefficient of the variable to the difference in the average values of the variable for this  
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period between New Zealand and the average country in the sample. For example, New 
Zealand had a higher mismatch than the average country for the period, which the model 
estimates (other things being equal) would have added 0.8 percentage points to the 
predicted risk vis-à-vis the baseline (average country’s) probability. 
 
Figure 4 and 5 repeat the exercise for sudden stops in 1880-1913, a period in 
which New Zealand had three sudden stops. Shaded regions in Figure 4 
represent the actual years of crises. The model seems to predict well the 
periods of relative vulnerability of New Zealand to a sudden stop. Predicted 
risk for New Zealand tended to be higher in years preceding the actual years 
of crises. Figure 5 suggests that New Zealand’s relative vulnerability to 
sudden stops in this period could be related to its higher level of original sin 
and to a lesser extent lower gold reserves than average. These effects offset 
vulnerability reductions from New Zealand’s trade surpluses and relatively 
high openness. Overall, the predicted risk for New Zealand of a sudden stop 
was 1 percentage points higher than the average predicted risk for the 
sample. 
 
Figure 4  



















































































Differences in predicted risk of a sudden stop for New Zealand vis-


























Note: The figure shows differences in predicted risk of a sudden stop for New Zealand 
vis-à-vis the average country in the sample. Each bar represents a marginal contribution 
of a significant variable in the model (reported in Table 3, column 1) to the difference in 
predicted probabilities. The marginal contribution of each of the variable is calculated by 
multiplying the estimated coefficient of the variable to the difference in the average 
values of the variable for this period between New Zealand and the average country in 
the sample. For example, New Zealand had a higher original sin than the average 
country for the period, which the model estimates (other things being equal) would have 
added 2.6 percentage points to the predicted risk vis-à-vis the baseline (average 
country’s) probability. 
 
4.2  The second era of globalisation, 1972-1997 
In the second era of globalisation, New Zealand had more frequent currency 
crises but fewer sudden stops – the opposite of what it experienced in the 
first era of globalisation (table 1 and table A2). The cross-country results 
show that countries that had frequent currency crises in this period tended to 
have high original sin with mismatch, high overall levels of debt, high 






Determinants of currency crises, 1972-1997 
   (1)    (2)    (3)    
Original Sin  0.004 *  0.004 **       
   (0.002)    (0.002)         
Original Sin^2  -3.0E-05    -2.6E-05         
   (2.3E-05)    (1.7E-05)         
Mismatch  0.029 *       0.006    
   (0.016)         (0.021)    
Debt/output  8.3E-04 **  0.001 *** 2.5E-04    
   (3.4E-04)    (3.3E-04)    (5.9E-04)    
Growth of terms of trade  0.001    4.7E-04    0.001    
   (0.001)    (1.0E-03)    (0.001)    
Trade balance/ GDP  -0.003    -0.003    -0.003    
   (0.003)    (0.002)    (0.004)    
Long-term interest rates  0.013 *  0.012 *  0.020  *** 
   (0.008)    (0.007)    (0.008)    
G7 av. Long-term interest rate  0.005    0.005    -0.002    
   (0.009)    (0.009)    (0.009)    
Pegged exchange rate  0.081 **  0.070 *  0.023    
   (0.046)    (0.044)    (0.045)    
Inflation  2.9E-04 *** 4.1E-04 *** 4.1E-04  *** 
   (6.1E-05)    (1.2E-04)    (1.3E-04)    
Reserves/ M2  -0.164 *** -0.182 *** -0.101  *** 
   (0.055)    (0.045)    (0.050)    
Ln(GDP per capita)  -0.019    -0.029 *  -0.046  *** 
   (0.019)    (0.016)    (0.023)    
Banking crisis  0.028    0.042    0.019    
   (0.044)    (0.041)    (0.040)    
                  
                  
Observations  389    407    452    
Observed Risk  0.139    0.135    0.135    
Predicted Risk (at x-bar)  0.095    0.093    0.114    
Percent of Correct Positive†  70.4    74.5    68.9    
Percent of Correct Negative†  68.1    65.1    61.6    
Pseudo R
2  0.156    0.147    0.083    
   
Note: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for sudden stops (SS1). Explanatory variables 
are in one-period lag (t-1) unless otherwise indicated. Reported coefficients are marginal 
effects of variables on the probability of a sudden stop. Robust clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. † Cut-off = 
observed risk in the data.  
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Countries with relatively low per capita income (a proxy for’weak 
institutions’) also suffered more crises.
7 
 
Figure 6 and 7 show predicted risk of a currency crisis in New Zealand 
relative to average for 1972-1997. Figure 6 shows that predicted risk for 
New Zealand was higher than for the average country in the sample 
throughout the period but especially between the mid 1970s and the mid 
1980s when the country actually suffered frequent currency crises. Figure 7 
suggests that New Zealand’s vulnerability to currency crises over the period 
is related to its weak fundamentals in most relevant areas other than per 
capita income. It had higher original sin, higher debt relative to output, 
higher interest rates, and lower international reserves. The net predicted risk 
was nearly 9 percentage points higher than the average in the sample, 
although there were other countries in the sample (predominately developing 
countries) that suffered more crises and had higher predicted risk. 
 
Figure 6  








































































                                                 
7 Because of the lack of cross country data, the regression exercises are not repeated for 
sudden stops for the second era of globalisation.  
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Figure 7  
Differences in predicted risk of a currency crisis for New Zealand 






























Note: The figure shows the difference in predicted risk of a currency crisis for NZ vis-à-vis 
the average country in the sample. Each bar represents a marginal contribution of a 
significant variable in the model (reported in Table 4, column 1) to the difference in 
predicted probabilities. The marginal contribution of each of the variable is calculated by 
multiplying the estimated coefficient of the variable to the difference in the average values 
of the variable for this period between NZ and the average country in the sample. For 
example, NZ had a higher mismatch than the average country for the period, which the 
model estimates ( other things being equal) would have added 2.6 percentages point to the 
predicted risk vis-à-vis the baseline (average country’s) probability. 
 
4.3   Out-of-sample predictions for New Zealand, 1998-2008 
To understand how risk facing New Zealand has changed since the end of 
the sample, Figure 8 examines the out-of-sample predictions for New 
Zealand’s probability of currency crises for 1998-2008.
8  This  exercise 
suggests New Zealand faces much lower risk of a currency crisis today due 
                                                 
8  To produce the out-of-sample predictions, we used the within-sample estimates of 
marginal effects from the currency crises regression for 1972-1997 (table 4, column (1)), 
and applied the out-of-sample values for key policy variables in New Zealand (eg 
mismatch, long term interest rates, etc). The out-of-sample GDP per capita for New 
Zealand is scaled by the average of the out-of-sample GDP per capita for other countries 
in the sample to avoid the obvious bias that would result otherwise. Information on out-of-




to improvements since the mid 1990s in many areas of policy weaknesses 
identified in the previous period.  Declining original sin, mismatch, overall 
level of debt, long term interest rates and the floating of the NZD are 
estimated to have had a particularly significant impact in reducing the risk of 
currency crises based on our cross country model. 
It is important to note that declining inflation and long-term interest rates 
have been features of the last decade for many other countries, and there 
have been relatively few currency crises.  New Zealand risk has declined 
relative to the average country in the 1972-1997 dataset, but may not have 
declined as much relative to the average country today.  A second important 
caveat is that new sources of risk of currency crisis have arisen that are not 
features of our dataset and model.  For example, private sector debt has 
become an increasingly important risk factor for national balance sheets.  We 
believe that cross-country analysis of more recent period exploring new 
sources of risk for currency crises and sudden stops would be an interesting 
piece of future work. 
In sum, New Zealand was less exposed than the other countries in the sample 
to the risks of currency crises in the first era of globalisation because of its 
better fundamentals, but was more exposed to sudden stops because of its 
relatively high level of original sin. In the second era, New Zealand was 
more exposed than the other countries in the sample to the risk of  currency 
crises despite its relatively high  income per capita (a proxy for ‘sound 
institutions’) because of weaknesses in fundamentals such as substantial 
government debt.  Since then, improvements in fundamentals have reduced 
the risks of currency crises facing New Zealand, according to our model, but 
it is important to note that new sources of risks that our model does not 





Out of sample differences in predicted risk of a currency crisis for 








































5  Global shocks, financial crises and the New     
Zealand economy 
 
In this section, we explore the impact of financial crises on New Zealand 
growth and compare it to the impact of global influences such as major 
country growth or the terms of trade.  New Zealand’s small size means we 
can use trading partner growth and world price variables to explain New 
Zealand growth without worrying about causality issues: if New Zealand 
macroeconomic variables are correlated with global macroeconomic 
variables, it must be the global variables driving New Zealand growth rather 
than the other way around.
9  Because we are dealing with a 120 year dataset 
spanning multiple exchange rate regimes and many technological shifts we 
naturally do not expect the precise lags between variables to have been 
stable.  For this reason, and also to eliminate noise, we use a smoothed 
growth rate (the three year change in the three year moving average) for the 
dependent variable (NZ growth) and most of the explanatory variables. We 
                                                 
9 This has frequently been exploited in empirical work (see e.g. Buckle et al 2002) looking 
at higher frequency data for the post-reform period.  
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refer to this transformation below as a smoothed growth rate or simply 
growth. 
The global macroeconomic variables we consider are the US growth rate, 
terms of trade, and UK consol rate. We include the US growth rate as an 
indicator of global economic activity. We also tried UK growth as well as (or 
instead of) US growth in unreported specifications, but this did not fit well.  
While the direct trade links between New Zealand and the UK were more 
important than New Zealand/US trade until the mid 1970s, the US was 
already a key driver of the global business cycle in the interwar period, and 
this may be why US growth fits better (figure 9).  As discussed below, we 
use UK real interest and a UK/NZ real exchange rate in the regression.  We 
use these UK variables partly because of data availability, but also because 
of the strong direct trade links, and the fact that the UK was the key overseas 
capital market for New Zealand firms for much of the period under 
examination. New Zealand’s terms of trade is also expected to be an 
important independent driver of domestic activity (with commodity booms 
boosting farm incomes for example) and does indeed add a lot of 













Figure 9  



























Before adding crisis variables, we experimented with simple regressions of 
NZ growth on domestic policy variables.  We were unable to find a stable 
relationship between NZ growth and domestic real interest rates over the 
period.  This may reflect the multiplicity of monetary policy regimes, which 
limits the ability of the simple model to identify monetary policy shocks (eg 
endogenous monetary tightenings may be coincident with strong economic 
growth).  The relationship between NZ growth and the real exchange rate (of 
the NZD against sterling) was more stable. The NZD gradually depreciated 
against sterling until around the 1930s while measured UK inflation 
generally outpaced NZ’s through the period, so that the real exchange rate 
gradually fell (figure 10).  The fluctuations in the smoothed real exchange 






Figure 10  
NZ/UK nominal exchange rate, relative CPIs and implied real 

























































Table 5, column 1 shows our benchmark regression in which NZ growth is 
explained by the smoothed growth rates of the terms of trade, the real 
exchange rate and US growth  To account for serial correlation in the 
residuals induced by the three year growth rate we added an AR(2) process 
for the residuals. 
As can be seen, real US output, the terms of trade and the real exchange rate 
are statistically significant and have expected signs. The UK real interest rate 
was not significant but is correctly signed. The adjusted R2 of .85 suggests 
that these variables do reasonably well in explaining New Zealand growth 





Regressions explaining fluctuations in New Zealand growth 
   (1)   (2)   
              
Constant  3.05    3.24   
   (2.62)    (2.75)   
Terms of trade (-1)  0.17    0.16   
   (3.64)    (3.55)   
US per capita GDP (-1)  0.18    0.16   
   (2.32)    (2.13)   
Real exchange rate (-3)  -0.14    -0.15   
   (-1.99)    (-2.20)   
Real UK Consol rate (-3)  0.10    0.15   
   (0.51)    (0.76)   
NZ Capital inflows (-1)        6.87   
         (2.03)   
NZ Bank crisis dummy        -1.76   
         (-1.26)   
Residual AR(1) term  1.31    1.32   
   (16.05)    (15.86)   
Residual AR(2) term  -0.59    -0.59   
   (-7.35)   (-7.22)   
              
              
Number of observations  109    109   
Adjusted R
2  0.852    0.857   
 
Note: Dependent variable, Terms of trade, US GDP and real exchange rate are smoothed 
growth rates (the three year change in the three year moving average).  Capital inflow is a 2 
year change in the 2 year moving average ratio to GDP. T-statistics in parentheses. 
Significant coefficients (at 5% or better) are shown in bold. 
 
We then introduced our different measures of NZ crisis dates into the 
regression.  We tried specifications (not reported) that included the 
indicators of currency crises or sudden stops from table 1 above, but they 
were not statistically significant and were often incorrectly signed.  This 
differs from the results in cross-country analysis like Bordo, Cavallo and 
Meissner (2007) where sudden stops have a discernable impact on growth.  
This may be because we have a number of variables in the regression (such 
as the terms of trade and world interest rates) which are likely to be 
correlated with sudden stops (indeed Bordo, Cavallo and Meissner use them  
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as explanators of sudden stops in an earlier regression).   
In specification (2), we use a measure of capital inflows
10 rather  than  a 
binary sudden stop indicator, and this is correctly signed and marginally 
significant.  Also in specification (2), the two periods of banking crisis have 
a negative impact on growth, although the coefficient is not precisely 
estimated or significant. The coefficient is consistent with a four year 
banking crisis reducing output by about 2.5 percentage points in total. 
Figure 12 illustrates the impact of all the regressors in the benchmark 
regression (the black line) compared to the actual variable (blue line). The 
impacts of the key driving variables are represented additively by the stacked 
bars.  To make the influences of the driving variables clearer the 
autocorrelation in the residuals is not included in the fitted values.  US 
growth and the terms of trade explain much of the variation in real growth 
across many of the growth cycles.  The real exchange rate often partly 
offsets the terms of trade effect (so the exchange rate is acting as a buffer).  
Fit is generally good, however the regression struggles to explain the 
weakness of New Zealand’s economic performance in the second half of the 
1920s (a period noted as difficult to explain by other writers).
11  It is also 
unable to explain the strength of the economic recovery after the depression, 
which may partly relate to the imposition of import controls in 1938 and the 
subsequent shift to wartime production.  The banking crisis variable helps 
explain weak periods of growth around the two banking crises.  The impact 
of the capital flow variable is relatively minor. 
                                                 
10 Capital flows are proxied by the inverse of the trade balance (ie M minus X) plus change 
in reserves. This ignores invisible components of the current account like investment 
income, but investment income is unlikely to drive the cycle in capital flows. The variable 
used in the regression is the two year change in the two year moving average of the capital 
inflow to output ratio. This is mainly to reduce the impact of year to year noise.  
11 Easton (2007) suggests further analysis of the interwar period and the 1920s in particular 
is necessary.  International currency misalignment and the NZ link to Sterling (which was 
back on gold at an overvalued exchange rate by 1924) may have played a part.  The boom 






































While we preferred to work with smoothed variables for the reasons 
discussed above, the smoothing can be interpreted as a particular set of 
parameter restrictions on a simple annual growth regression.  To test the 
robustness of our results to this, we ran some regressions using simple 
annual growth rates.  This naturally did not fit as well (see table A3) but 
continued to imply the international driving variables (particularly the terms 
of trade in this specification) explained New Zealand growth better than the 
crisis variables. This was also true in pre and post WWII sub-samples. 
The limited explanatory power of ‘crises’ over and above international 
variables is an interesting result.  It may reflect the relatively mild nature of 
many of the ‘crises’ in New Zealand history (for example, the fact that the 
two banking crises largely involved a single leading bank rather than the 
entire banking system and never provoked a widespread collapse in banking 
confidence). It may also suggest that financial crises in New Zealand are 
mainly an endogenous response to stress brought on by exogenous global 
forces rather than a significant independent source of variation in the New 
Zealand growth rate.  It is hard to test this hypothesis for many countries 
since there is significant two way causality between domestic and 
international variables, but as discussed above we are able to plausibly treat 
international variables as exogenous to New Zealand developments.  
We next tested whether there was evidence of instability over time in the 
coefficients of global growth and the terms of trade, using recursive 
regressions and estimating a simplified version of the benchmark regression 
with a Kalman filter.  The time varying parameters on the terms of trade, US 
growth and the real exchange rate are shown in figure 13. It appears that the 
responsiveness of New Zealand growth to these variables may have fallen 
gradually after 1938. This could reflect both the extensive economic controls 
imposed between 1938 and 1984 (the period shaded in blue) and the use of 
floating exchange rates as an economic buffer post 1984. It is difficult to see 
much of a difference in the coefficients of the three variables between the 




Time varying coefficients from New Zealand growth regression 































The value of the real exchange rate as a buffer against terms of trade 
fluctuations is apparent in figure 11.  One interesting question is the extent to 
which the responsiveness of the real exchange rate to the terms of trade may 
have increased since the 1985 float. A simple regression over 1885-2008 of 
the smoothed real exchange rate change on the smoothed terms of trade 
change (with a third lag to allow for the potential for the real exchange rate 
to respond more slowly in fixed rate regimes) suggests that the real exchange 
rate responded to the terms of trade in both samples.  However, there was 
less response and some evidence of a lag in the insulationist period (1938-
84) and the full sample, while in the post float period the response was 
stronger and not lagged.  This suggests that the real exchange rate may have 






Table 6  
Regressions of the NZ real exchange rate on the terms of trade 
   (1)   (2)    (3)    
                 
Constant  -1.82   -0.72    -4.46    
   (-2.42)   (-0.49)    (-1.37)    
Terms of trade  0.31   0.31    1.47    
   (4.79)   (3.45)    (2.92)    
Terms of trade (-3)  0.12   0.11    0.02    
   (1.79)   (1.22)    (0.05)    
Residual AR(1) term  1.35   1.29    1.39    
   (23.84)   (9.44)    (12.97)    
Residual AR(2) term  -0.80   -0.66    -0.82    
   (-14.03)   (-4.80)    (-7.74)    
                 
                 
Number of observations  124   47    24    
Adjusted R
2  0.874   0.833    0.887    
 
Note: Real exchange rate and terms of trade are 3 year moving average growth rates. T- 
statistics in parentheses. Significant coefficients (at 5% or better) are shown in bold. 
 
 
6 Conclusions  and  Lessons for Policy 
 
Financial crises have occurred across most countries and across different 
exchange rate regimes.  Cross country empirical literature studying periods 
of strong globalisation suggests that countries have some hope of avoiding 
financial crises by following sound policies and adopting sound institutions, 
and our analysis of New Zealand appears consistent with this. In the first era 
of globalisation New Zealand was less exposed to a currency crisis than the 
average country.  For the second era of globalisation, however, New Zealand 
was more exposed to a currency crisis than the average country because of 
its weak fundamentals. Our out-of-sample prediction for New Zealand 
suggests that improvements in many of the policy areas (mismatch, debt to 
GDP, international reserves, etc.) in the more recent period meant that New 
Zealand faces much lower risk of a currency crisis today than a decade ago. 
However, the global business cycle can still exert powerful effects on small 
open economies like New Zealand even if they follow basically sound  
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policies and avoid serious financial crises. Our time series analyses suggests 
that shocks to US real GDP (as a proxy for global output) and shocks to the 
terms of trade have significant impact on New Zealand’s medium-term 
growth.  Domestic crisis-dummy variables add little explanatory power to 
the regressions of its growth rate over and above the impact of the 
international factors.  The relationship between NZ growth and the 
international factors has remained broadly stable over the 120 year period we 
study, although we find some evidence that the real exchange rate has been a 
faster ‘shock absorber’ in response to terms of trade fluctuations since the 




Appendix A  Data Sources 
General notes: Our data for cross country analyses in section four 
comes from Bordo and Meissner (2006b) and Bordo and Meissner (2009). 
We appended New Zealand data to their dataset using the Statistics New 
Zealand (SNZ)’s long-term data series. This includes inflation, government 
debt and revenue, trade and GDP data, and the terms of trade. To cover more 
recent years, the long term data series are spliced to modern sources from the 
Reserve Bank database. Where key variables were missing for NZ we filled 
them according to the description below. 
Reserves: The Bordo and Meissner mismatch measure is (Government 
external debt – reserves / exports).  We do not have data for NZ reserves in 
the early period (1880-1913)and therefore use estimated values. Specifically, 
we assumed that NZ maintained the same level of import cover (a ratio of 
reserves to import) as Australia for the period and multiplied Australia’s 
import cover by NZ’s imports to get NZ’s reserves. For the most recent 
period, we use the IFS measure of NZ external debt (line 89a) and of 
Reserves (line 1l).  IFS external debt figures are discontinued around 2001 
and we switch to the external debt figures from the SNZ Overseas debt 
survey. 
Exchange rate: The NZD/Sterling real exchange rate is calculated 
using historical UK CPI data from O’Donaghue (2004) and a nominal 
exchange rate series from Briggs (2003). 
Capital flows: New Zealand capital inflows are estimated using the 
identity that the current account plus change in reserves is equal to the 
capital account.  The trade balance is used as a proxy for the variability in 
the current account (debt service being likely to be less cyclical).  Reserves 
data are only available after 1948 (using IFS line 1l) and the change in 
reserves is assumed to be zero prior to that. 
An Exchange Market Pressure indicator is constructed along the lines 
of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1994) to identify currency crises using 
changes in the exchange rate, interest rates, and reserves.  However, the 
historical use of capital controls and the lack of reserves data prior to 1948 
reduce the reliability of this indicator.  The currency crises we identify in 
historical narrative tend to be coincident with actual depreciation in the 
exchange rate.    
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International variables in New Zealand growth regression: 
International variables in the growth regression are sourced from the Bordo 
et al (2001) dataset available at michael.bordo.googlepages.com/   
 
Appendix B  List of Variables and Definitions 
Original sin  Debt that carried a gold clause or made payable at a fixed rate in a 
foreign currency as the ratio of this quantity to total public debt 
outstanding. Defined as max [0, 1-(debt issued in local currency/ total 
debt issued by country)] 
Mismatch  A ratio of the difference between total external debt and international 
reserves to exports 
Debt to revenue  A ratio of total debt to total government revenue
Growth of terms of trade  Change in terms of trade 
Trade balance to GDP  Trade balance to GDP
Long-term interest rate  Long-term interest rate (%) 
UK consol rate  Interest rate on UK Consol – a form of British government bond, gilt, 
dating originally from the 18th century (%) 
Gold cover ratio  A ratio of international reserves to M1 
Pegged exchange rate  Dummy=1 for country/ year in pegged exchange rates 
Inflation   Change in CPI when available; otherwise change in GDP deflator (%)
Real GDP per capita (log)  GDP per capita in constant 1989 dollars
Banking crises  Dummy=1 for country/ year in banking crisis 
Hard currency debt to GDP  A ratio of hard currency debt to GDP
Growth of money  Changes in M3 
Trade openness  A ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP 
Debt to output  Total debt to GNP (%) 
G7 average long-term interest 
rate 
Unweighted average of G7 long-term interest rates (%) 
Reserves to M2  International reserves to M2 
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Table A1  
Countries in estimation samples  
(Number of time-series observations on the right) 
Determinants of currency 
crises, 1880-1993  Obs.    
Determinants of sudden 
stops, 1880-1913  Obs. 
  
Argentina 28  Argentina 28 
Australia 32  Australia 33 
Austria 32  Austria 32 
Brazil 31  Belgium  32 
Canada 32  Brazil  32 
Denmark 32  Canada  32 
France 32  Denmark  27 
Germany 32  Finland  2 
Italy 32  Greece  29 
Japan 7  Italy 32 
New Zealand  32  Japan  7 
Norway 14  New  Zealand  32 
Portugal 32  Norway 32 
Spain 32  Portugal  32 
Sweden 2  Spain  32 
United States  31  Sweden  2 
United States  32 
Total sample  433     Total sample  448 
Determinants of currency 
crises, 1972-1997  Obs.        Obs.  
Argentina 9  New  Zealand  23 
Australia 18  Norway  14 
Belgium 18  Pakistan 16 
Brazil 13  Peru  7 
Columbia 11  Philippines 5 
Costa Rica  11  Sri Lanka  11 
Canada 17  Spain  6 
Chile 13  Sweden  19 
Denmark 12  Thailand 13 
Ecuador 9  Turkey  2 
Ghana 10  Uruguay  13 
Germany 5  United  Kingdom  19 
India 15  United  States  19 
Indonesia 10  Venezuela  10 
Jamaica 12  Zimbambwe  9 
Malaysia 13 
Mexico 7 





Frequency of crises by country 
(Number of crises in parentheses) 
Currency crises, 1880-
1993  Freq.    Sudden stops, 1880-1913  Freq. 
  
Argentina (3) Greece  (5) 
Canada (3) Japan  (4) 
Japan (3) New  Zealand  (3) 
Brazil (2) Argentina  (2) 
Germany (2) Canada  (2) 
Italy (2) Sweden  (2) 
France (1) Australia  (1) 
Portugal (1) Austria  (1) 
United States  (1) Brazil  (1) 
Australia (0) Finland  (1) 
Austria (0) Italy  (1) 
Denmark (0) Norway  (1) 
New Zealand  (0) Portugal  (1) 
Norway (0) United  States  (1) 
Spain (0) Belgium  (0) 
Sweden (0) Denmark  (0) 
Spain (0) 
Currency crises, 1972-
1997  Freq.       Freq. 
Argentina (8) Belgium  (2) 
Zimbabwe (8) Brazil  (2) 
Jamaica (7) Canada  (2) 
Mexico (6) India  (2) 
Pakistan (6) Malaysia  (2) 
Peru (6) Norway  (2) 
Uruguay (6) Sweden  (2) 
Indonesia (5) United  Kingdom  (2) 
Spain (5) Costa  Rica  (1) 
Turkey (5) Ghana  (1) 
Venezuela (5) Sri  Lanka  (1) 
Australia (4) Thailand (1) 
Chile (4) United  States  (1) 
Denmark (4) Colombia  (0) 
Ecuador (4) Germany  (0) 
Philippines (4)
New Zealand  (3)         






Annual New Zealand growth regressions  
  (1) (2) 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant -4.55  -1.37  -5.31  -1.61 
NZ  Growth  (-1)  .09 .94 .04 .39 
NZ Growth (-2)  -.27 -2.86 -.29 -3.02 
Terms  of  Trade  .05 1.35 .05 1.55 
Terms  of  Trade(-1)  .02 .65 .02 .66 
US Per Capita GDP(-1)  .08  .90  .05  .61 
US Per Capita GDP(-2)  -.14  -1.60  -.13  -1.54 
Real UK Consol rate(-2)  -.36  -1.34  -.20  -.75 
Real  exchange  rate(-2)  -.09 -1.33 -.09 -1.34 
NZ Capital inflows      11.68  1.23 
Banking Crisis indicator (-3)     -3.92  -2.38 
Sudden Stop Indicator (-2)      .07  -.75 
      




2  .15 .18 
N  109 109 
 
Variables are as discussed in the main text, but NZ and US growth, the real exchange rate and 
the terms of trade are simple annual growth rates rather than the 3 year change in the 3 year 
moving average used in the main text.  Wald test on terms of trade tests (and rejects) the 
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